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failure by auditors to adequately detect
and warn of accounting irregularities
and bankruptcies."
The authors have concluded that the
information presented in the Weiss
research does not support the report's
conclusion, and could have invalidly
supported certain parts of the SarbanesOxley Act.

The Weiss Report
The Weiss Report, submitted to the
U.S. Senate, made the following observations:
[Flor shareholders seeking protection,
Wall Street research analysts are merely the second line of defense. The first
line of defense is manned by public
auditors, the subject of this paper ....
Herein, we examine auditing firms in
two closely related areas: (a) in terms
of their performance in warning the
public of accounting irregularities;
and (b) in terms of their performance
in warning of bankruptcies.
The Weiss Report concluded that
"The data demonstrate a broad and
massive failure by auditors to adequately detect and warn of accounting irregularities and bankruptcies as the first
line of defense against precisely such
problems." This conclusion was based
upon the number of "yellow flags" that
selected bankrupt companies had with

respect to their financial condition. The
reader is led to believe that the Weiss
model (two out of seven yellow flags) is
a reliable and widely accepted method
for anticipating bankruptcy.

SAS 59
Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) 59, The Auditor's Consideration
of an Entity's Ability to Continue as a
Going Concern, was issued over a
decade ago in response to increasing
concerns about whether auditors had
been taking sufficient responsibility for
evaluating a client's ability to continue
as a going concern. Since the issuance
of SAS 59, auditors have sought guidance in making going-concern decisions (see the Sidebar).
SAS 59 states that the auditor has a
responsibility to evaluate whether there
is substantial doubt about an entity's
ability to continue as a going concern
for a period not to exceed one year from
the date of the financial statements
being audited. Auditors are not responsible for predicting future events or conditions. Weiss implies and assumes that
the auditors failed because a going-concern report was not issued for selected
companies that later went bankrupt. SAS
59 notes "[thatJ an entity may cease to
exist as a going concern subsequent to
receiving a report from the auditor

SAS 59 REQUIREMENTS
An auditor's responsibility to evaluate whether an entity is a going concern is for a period not to exceed one year from the date of the audited financial statements.
• Auditors are not responsible for predicting future events.
• The subsequent bankruptcy by a company that did not receive a goingconcern report, even if it is within one year of the balance sheet date, does
not necessarily mean inadequate performance by the auditor.
• An auditor is not required to perform specillc procedures to determine if
an entity is a going concern. Audit procedures for other audit objectives are
considered sufficient.
• An auditor is required to evaluate management's plans to mitigate conditions and events that indicate there might be substantial doubt that an entity
is a going concern.
• If the auditor concludes there is substantial doubt, the auditor must consider the impact on the financial statements and related disclosures, to determine the effect on the audit opinion.
• There are specific documentation requirements associated with the
assessment of an entity's ability to continue as a going concern.
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[which] docs not refer to substantial
doubt, even within one year following
the date of the financial statements, docs
not, in itself, indicate inadequate performance by the auditor." The standard
also states that the absence of such a reference to substantial doubt in the audit
report should not be considered "providing assurance as to an entity's ability
to continue as a going concern."
An auditor is not required to design
audit procedures solely for the purpose
of determining whether there is substantial doubt that an entity will continue as a
going concern. Audit procedures
designed for other audit objectives, such
as analytical procedures and review of
compliance with debt and loan
covenants, are considered sut11cient. In
performing these procedures, there are
conditions and events that could indicate
that there is substantial doubt an entity
will continue as a going concern. Examples of such items listed in SAS 59 include
negative trends (e.g., working capital
deficiencies; negative cash flows from
operations); indicators of financial difficulties (e.g., def~llIlt on loan agreements);
internal matters (e.g., labor difficulties);
and external matters (e.g., legislation that
might affect an entity's ability to operate).
The Weiss Report notes that there
was evidence of negative trends for all
the bankrupt companies it examined.
Although Weiss concludes that the
existence of two yellow flags (negative
ratios) out of seven is an indication of
substantial doubt, there is nothing in
SAS 59 or any other authoritative literature to support this contention.
If the conditions or events identified
in SAS 59 exist, the auditor is reqUired
to evaluate management's plans for
dealing with the impact of these items,
such as: disposing of assets; borrowing
money or restructuring debt; reducing
or delaying expenditures; and increasing ownership equity. If, after evaluating management's plans, the auditor
concludes that there is substantial
doubt an entity will continue as a going
concern, the auditor must consider the
impact on the fInancial statements and
the appropriateness of the related disclosures. Under SAS 59, disclosures
could include: conditions and events
giving rise to the assessment of substantial doubt about the entity'S ability to
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continue as a going concern; the possible effect of such con- actions." The label for this intermediate level is a "yellow flag."
ditions and events; management's evaluation of the signifi- Using specific quantitative benclunarks for each of the seven
ratios, Weiss counted the number of yellow flags for each of
cance of those conditions and events; and mitigating factors.
The Weiss Report fails to address the auditor's evaluation the companies and reported their frequency distribution.
The Weiss research has numerous and important limitations:
of management's plans, an aspect of the audit process that
researchers have found difficult to model. If the auditor con- • The seven ratios used by Weiss were based on individual
cludes there is substantial doubt, an explanatory paragraph is ratios that have not been proved to predict bankruptcies. In
added after the opinion paragraph. The phrase "substantial addition, the ratios appear to have been selected arbitrarily
doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern," or from several sources, with arbitrary cutoffs that are not
something Similar, is used. Inadequate disclosure with accepted industry standards. Weiss cites three sources for
respect to an entity's ability to continue as a going concern choosing the ratios: a study by Mills and Yamamura (journal
could result in a qualified or adverse opinion. An auditor'S oj Accountancy, October 1998); the 1966 Beaver study; and
responsibility is to render an opinion as to whether a compa- a page reference in a 1974 text by Bernstein on financial
ny's financial statements and related disclosures are fairly statement analysis. First, the Mills and Yamamura article sugstated. Weiss does not indicate whether the financial state- gests ratios that might be useful for auditors in forming their
ment disclosures were examined to determine whether such going-concern decisions. The article neither tests for nor
proves any relationships between the ratios and bankruptcy.
disclosures adequately supported the opinion rendered.
SAS 59 also requires an auditor to document the following Second, the Beaver study does not use individual ratios;
items: the conditions or events that indicate a substantial rather, it tests the predictive ability of a group of ratios.
doubt about an entity's ability to continue as a going con- Third, the reference in the Bernstein text relates to bankruptcern; the elements of management's plans that the auditor cy prediction studies by Altman. Altman's Bankruptcy Preconsidered to be particularly significant to overcoming the diction Model and the Koh methodology have been proved
adverse effects of the conditions; the auditing procedures to reliably predict bankruptcies. Weiss did not use either of
performed and evidence obtained to evaluate management's those models, however, which use a group of ratios collecplans; the auditor's conclusion as to whether substantial tively to predict bankmptcy, not individual ratios as in Weiss.
doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going con,------------------------------------------------cern is alleviated; and the auditor's conclusion as to whether
an explanation in the auditor's report is necessary.

Research Background
The Weiss Report identified 307 companies that declared
bankmptcy between January 1,2001, and June 30,2002, from
which Weiss eliminated all companies that declared bankmptcy more than a year after the date of the most recent financial
statements (the SAS 59 time limitation). Weiss also eliminated
all companies that did not receive a "clean bill of health,"
meaning an unqualified opinion with no mention of goingconcern problems. This left only 45 companies that went
bankrupt after having received an unqualified audit report.
In the study, seven financial ratios were computed based on
the financial statements for the fiscal period immediately preceding the company's bankmptcy. These ratios were:
• Cash flow from operations to total debt
• Net working capital to total assets
• Debt to equity
• Return on equity
• Current ratio
• Net income to sales
• Cash flow to current liabilities.
Weiss indicated that auditors currently have only two choices when issuing their audit reports: submit a clean bill of health
(a "green light"), or raise going-concern issues (a "red flag").
Weiss recommended that an additional, intermediate level of
warning be made available for public companies, and suggested language for this warning: "The company is currently stable
but may sutfer tlnancial pressures if the business environment
deteriorates within the next 12 months. This level of warning
alerts shareholders and regulators but does not invoke SEC
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• The Weiss Report covered only
selected bankrupt companies. There
was no comparison between bankrupt
and nonbankrupt companies. Such an
analysis would have provided evidence
whether or not these ratios differentiate
bankrupt from nonbankrupt companies.

The authors examined 3,610 active
nonbankrupt public companies as well
as 97 bankrupt public companies in
order to determine if the Weiss ratios
could accurately predict bankruptcy.
Unlike Weiss, which included only
companies where the auditors did not

The flaws of the Weiss Report
suggest that the study cannot be relied upon as an
indicator of the success or failure of auditing firms to
predict the bankruptcy of a company.
• Weiss asserted that the seven financial ratios used in the study are "commonly used by auditors to help flag difficulties." There is no empirical evidence,
however, that auditors use these ratios
for that purpose. Nor is there evidence
that these individual ratios have been
determined to be valid for predicting
financial distress or bankruptcy.
• The 45 companies selected went
bankrupt without their auditors issuing
a going-concern opinion. Weiss did not
include the cases in which auditors had
issued such an opinion.
• The study did not include qualitative measures, such as bond defaults or
off-balance sheet financing, or professional judgment in auditors' decisions.
These factors have to be integrated into
the decision process. If predicting
bankruptcies were as easy as computing seven basic ratios, then there would
be no need for an auditor's professional
judgment.

Testing the Conclusions
To determine if the seven Weiss criteria could predict bankruptcy, the
authors applied them to a sample of
nonbankrupt companies. The intention
was not to analyze the Weiss Report,
but merely to apply its ratios and yellow
flags. The results may prove unsettling
to the accounting profession and, possibly, to some members of Congress.
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correctly predict the bankruptcy, this
survey included all public companies
filing for bankruptcy in 2000 that had
filed a lO-K in the previous two years.
Weiss' Appendix A fully documented
the criteria for the seven ratios. The
authors drew active nonbankrupt companies from Compustat, using 2000 and
2001 annual financial data, exactly as
Weiss had done, in order to compute the
number of yellow flags for each ratio.
From these results, the authors determined that the Weiss criteria (two yellow flags) would have predicted that
46.9% of nonbankrupt companies
should have received a going-concern
opinion due to potential financial failure.
In other words, the Weiss criteria would
have incorrectly predicted bankruptcy
for 1,693 companies. Just as a correct
prediction of bankruptcy is desirable, an
incorrect prediction of bankruptcy has
negative consequences for the company,
its auditor, and its shareholders. Taken to
the extreme, the most foolproof way to
predict all bankruptcies is to predict that
all companies will go bankrupt, ignoring
the significant number of incorrect predictions in the process. The Weiss
research ignores the risk of incorrect
predictions of bankruptcy.
The Weiss Report's conclusion of "a
broad and massive failure by auditors to
adequately detect and warn of accounting irregularities and bankruptcies,"

cannot be taken lightly. It is reasonable
to assume that Weiss affected the view
of the U.S. senators and other parties
that read the study. Weiss proposed
seven measures, three of which relate
to consulting services. The SarbanesOxley Act has specific provisions that
restrict consulting work that auditors
can provide for their clients.
Studies offered in support of federal
legislation should be conducted using
proper criteria and research methodology. New legislation or audit regulations
should not be an overreaction to highly
publicized cases (e.g., Enron and WorldCom) unless these are indicative of a systemic problem. In addition, conclusions
should be based on the data and use
appropriate statistical tests. The flaws of
the Weiss Report-inadequate sample
selection; the use of criteria not proved
to predict bankruptcy; and the lack of
statistical support-suggest that the
study cannot be relied upon as an indicator of the success or failure of auditing
firms to predict the bankruptcy or the
going-concern status of a company. If
Weiss' standard of two yellow flags were
applied to all companies, auditors would
be predicting that almost half of their
clients would go bankrupt.
The Weiss conclusions represent a
widening of the gap between expectations of auditors' responsibilities and
the responsibilities auditors actually
assume. Because of this expectations
gap, the public often assumes that an
auditor has failed to perform adequately. The unfortunate repercussions of
studies like Weiss, which in fact
spurred new laws and regulations, lead
to increased costs of audit compliance
without delivering any improvement in
the prediction of bankruptcies.
0
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